Of Walls and Drowning

Geopolitics of Climate Change in the 21^st Century

William Sundwick

The term “geopolitics” was first used in the 19^th century to refer to the influence of geography on political actions of nations. When U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan published his seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, in 1890, imperialism was in full bloom. Great Power rivalry was centered around the part of the world we now know as the global South. It was competition among Britain, France, Germany, and the United States for resources needed by exploding industrial development – and growing populations in those “Northern” countries.

Early in the 20th century, Halford Mackinder introduced his “heartland theory” in The Geographical Pivot of History, published in 1904 in Great Britain. Mackinder emphasized the “world island” instead of Mahan’s “world ocean.” But both fathers of geopolitics had one thing in common: an underlying assumption that Malthusian population growth would outrun resources needed to sustain it, unless countries experiencing that growth could acquire more resources from places that weren’t experiencing such growth. That was the definition of imperialism: organized theft, via military power, from the poor to the rich. Not much changed until late in the century, when the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, ushering in a “uni-polar” world where one country, the U.S., dominated the new imperial order.

Now, in the 21^st century, we are confronted anew by a demographic challenge threatening stability and peace in the world. It is the looming specter of climate change. Just as it’s clear that world power relationships divide those with resources from those without, so is it clear that climate change will affect some countries more than others. Island states expect to be hardest hit, next are nations where the bulk of their population and resources are in low-lying coastal areas, such as India and Bangladesh. Rising sea levels threaten to wipe them out over the next several decades. Drought is also a climate change issue – affecting food supplies for many populations. These factors, along with the consequent disease, potentially will create huge waves of migration away from places most affected, and toward “safer” locations.

Even internal migration can threaten regional stability. Civil wars, like Syria’s, destabilize neighboring countries with secondary migrations of refugees. Weak governments, lacking access to resources, exacerbate the situation. And corruption is always a destabilizing influence.

When the United Nations was formed in the wake of World War II, its founders understood many of these factors. An organization built to promote world peace would need to address all of them to be successful. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is pursuing worldwide commitments from all governments regarding the impending threats of climate change, under the UN charter.

Unfortunately, many governments are still locked into the legacy of 19^th- 20^th century imperialism. The United Nations and IPCC aren’t imbued with the kind of authority needed to force progress from national, or tribal, loyalties to something approaching the “human family.” Once they acquire resources, nations tend to hoard them, stockpiling and guarding them against potential thieves.

When we hear expressions like “no borders, no country” we are hearing the selfishness of wealthy countries. Poor countries, those most at risk from climate change, don’t need borders. All borders are essentially intended to be fences. And, representative governments are chosen to represent the feelings of those who elect them, including irrational anxieties about “identity” loss. Wealthy countries tend to have more representative governments than poor countries, where corruption and strongmen often hold sway.

A world of “us vs. them” might work if resources were distributed equitably among all players. Cultural identity would then be quaint but wouldn’t carry life-or-death consequences. In the world of climate change and capitalism in the 21^st century, that is not the case. Saying “you have your own place, stay there” literally is consigning large numbers of human beings to death.

Aren’t people a resource? Why should migration be a threat? In a full employment economy, especially, additional labor can be a very real growth opportunity. Yet, the hoarding instinct and tribal preservation seem to be too easily ginned up in many Western nations’ political environments.

We’ve been through two or three decades where the promise of globalization seemed to offer a way out of the limitations of nationalism. It looked, for a while, like the world was “flat,” as Thomas Friedman wrote. Perhaps borders could someday be erased.

However, we came to realize, after the worldwide financial crisis of a decade ago, that capital flowed only in one direction -- toward the top. It didn’t flow outward or down. The world wasn’t flat, but a suction cup. Hence, issues of tribal identity and scarcity rose once again to prominence. Nations with a great deal of capital at their disposal could maintain powerful military establishments to enforce nationalism (if not expand it beyond their borders), and political expediency allowed capital to maintain its power. The multinational side of globalization began to lose its clout.

What is the meaning of “security” for any nation? If it means keeping its people safe, then meeting their needs should be equally important to countering any threats, real or imagined, from outside. Wars are seldom caused by efforts to meet a population’s economic needs, and there is even a body of opinion (socialist) that says wars originate from capitalism’s need to burn through excess capacity.

If we “follow the money” in international relations, we may be able to identify the real threats to national security and devise strategies to counter them. It’s important to understand boundaries between class, between haves and have-nots, not merely between nation-states. Power elites compete with one another – sometimes within a country, sometimes across borders – but, they compete as businesses do, not as national or cultural entities. Workers, their labor supply, are the pawns in this game. If elites need to import labor, they will – and as cheaply as possible. If they need to keep labor competition low, due to expansion, they will do that.

In order to move beyond the perverse cycle of hoarding and war, cooperation, at some high level, must replace competition. The human family must be exploited but not pitted against itself. Borders should be de-emphasized, not fortified. The United Nations has an admirable 75-year history of promoting world peace. It should be encouraged, not fought.

What has always been desirable, but never achievable, may be due to intrinsic evil in human nature. However, Darwin’s theory of natural selection does note that the most successful species are those that optimize  cooperation, not competition.

Our species deserves to die if it can’t overcome that evil side of competition. But even a dire apocalyptic vision allows for “some” to be saved!

History’s Greatest, Cruelest Levers of Power – Wars

And, How Morbid the Fascination

William Sundwick

Why So Fascinating?

Power is an intriguing study. It’s not an overstatement to say that history is all about exploring the exercise of power by different peoples in different times. Politics is power, and Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” His assumption was that nations would always pursue power, by politics and diplomacy, then when those fail, by war.

This was the world of feudal barons and princes, of nation states, of empires. It has been a driver of history from ancient times right through the twentieth century. Even in the 21^st century, we see ethnic groups and non-state actors resorting to organized violence for achieving political goals. And, some nation states still occasionally threaten their neighbors with war (North Korea, Iran?).

Great nations and empires aspire to control much larger expanses of territory than lesser nations. Alfred T. Mahan and Halford J. Mackinder gave us theoretical frameworks for imperialism, based on world geography, around the turn of the 20^th century. Like Clausewitz’s depressing philosophy in “On War,” their theories emphasized power and global hegemony (for further discussion of geopolitics, see my post from last May, “The Russian Bear and 21^st Century Geopolitics”).

Later historians have addressed the role of technology in wars. Again, domination in the field, leading ultimately to strategic ends, was the aim. In the twentieth century, both world wars seemed to support the thesis that victory in those titanic struggles belonged to the side that mastered the superior technology, and marshaled their economic resources to get it into the field. Not the most elegant plans, nor even the quality of the fighting men, that supplied the decisive margin in the world wars, but successful application of muscle.

So, for the student of history, exploring the role of wars is inescapable. Their study will always reach beyond the basics of “telling a story,” and touch politics, economics, engineering and physics. Military (and naval) history is the best way to bring all these disciplines together, through the lens of geography. Not all history buffs are so motivated, but some of us could not escape the morbid siren call of war, at least in our youth.

The Perfect Tool – Table-top Combat Simulation

My first exposure to commercial table-top simulations of military operations was in junior high school. A publisher in Baltimore had devised some fun board games and distributed them nationally. They used maps for the playing board, cardboard punch-outs for the playing pieces (representing combat formations), and relied heavily on probability (dice rolls) to resolve “combat” encounters between aggregations of opposing pieces. This was Avalon Hill Games, Inc. Its “Tactics II,” laid out on my bedroom floor, was an occasionally enjoyable pastime with friends – but, it became an obsession for me!

It was ahistorical, but loosely based on modern military tactics and formations. It was my very first exposure to any of this knowledge. There were armored divisions (designated by a bathtub symbol with two “Xs” on top), infantry divisions (a rectangle inscribed with a large “X”), airborne divisions (same symbol as infantry but including a small gull wing icon on the bottom). The map board was an idealized landform with mountains, forests, rivers, roads, and cities – including an island which could be reached only by bridge from the mainland, or with airborne forces. Movement of the playing pieces (“units”) was over a square grid, and the terrain features conformed to this grid. All playing pieces had weighted “strengths” indicated on the piece, and varying abilities to move over the grid, depending on terrain. Combat between opposing units was resolved against a “Combat Results Table” which determined 6:1 odds to be uniformly overwhelming – probability of success declining as odds got lower.

This simple abstraction of military engagement in the twentieth century became the basis for a much more complex line of games from Avalon Hill, and another company in New York, Simulations Publications, Inc. (SPI). Both game publishers indulged in historic re-enactments, “future history” conflicts only imagined (cold war clashes), and idealized tactical combat from different times and places in history. Some SPI games became monumental efforts. The grandest I attempted was “War in the Pacific,” which sought to provide a vehicle for the most dedicated gamers to re-fight ALL of World War II in the Pacific, from 1941-45. Its four large maps required a leaf extension and

plexiglass base for my dining room table. The map grids had long since replaced squares with hexagons (enabling orthogonal movement of pieces). The simple “CRT” with odds expressed as ratios of strengths, was now replaced by multiple probability tables for different types of combat, elaborate logistics rules and procedures, not only accurate orders of battle for army units, but actual warships – identified by name – and all the aircraft types present in theater! I played one entire Pacific War campaign – it took over a month of meeting daily (in the evening), never being able to eat at my dining room table for the duration.

By its peak in the early ‘80s, SPI had produced a powerhouse of historical data, good writing (not only complex game rules, but historical commentary in its two magazines, Strategy & Tactics, and Moves). They provided a unique opportunity for players with no technical expertise to engage in a pre-computer form of decision science. It was all rather advanced. But, in the end, not profitable – hostile takeover by the publisher of “Dungeons & Dragons,” and SPI’s ultimate demise came in 1982. Avalon Hill survived, but diversified into computer games and children’s titles, as a subsidiary of Hasbro.

Lessons Learned

Table-top wargames produced insight into history, risk and probability, geometry, and world geography. Rather than simply reading others’ interpretations of history, I could act out the drama in three dimensions (two-dimensional map plus time). My favorites were games that allowed for envelopment and breaches of defenses (Avalon Hill’s “1914” and “Stalingrad” – or anything dealing with World War II on an operational and strategic level), games featuring limited intelligence (naval games were good at this – Avalon Hill’s “Bismarck” and “Jutland, or “Battle for Midway” by another publisher, Game Designers Workshop), and games that emphasized strategic availability of assets attenuated over time (“War in the Pacific” or “War in the East”).

Beginning with that primitive “Tactics II” when I was fourteen, and lasting until I finally gave up, as an adult (quit playing when I got married), I learned about battlefield tactics, the influence of weapons technology (especially when a new technology changes the battlefield environment), and the importance of intelligence (most games provided far too much intelligence – not enough “fog of war”).  The role of decision theory, and the analysis of data, became a theme in my later life as I moved from the world of librarianship into information systems at the Library of Congress. Books, including combat narratives and after-action reports, morphed into tables of data, file structures, and vectoring. Gaming was a useful intellectual activity as the digital age began.

Who Did This Stuff?

As I entered adulthood, living on my own, still single, it occurred to me that the other devotees of table-top wargaming were a strange lot. They were all male. They were young and single, like me. They had no social life to speak of. As a socio-cultural group, they had some diversity of education, but all were white. Some were young professionals (often federal employees, including one CIA analyst), but many were less educated – blue collar types. Some had military backgrounds, but not all. I met no engineers, or anybody with a STEM educational background. They were all under the age of 35. And, there were no women, a serious drawback.

As I got older, with family responsibilities, and more financial resources, my orientation gradually changed. I began pursuit of graduate studies in an area inspired by those games -- systems analysis and decision sciences, computer information systems. The military history interest began to fade. Strategic Studies during the cold war continued to be a reading interest, but there simply wasn’t the time to spend hours and days playing complex table-top simulations.

Pacifism – When Young Men Grow Older and Wiser

My fascination, morbid or otherwise, with the study of power exercised by nation states ultimately ended shortly after the Gulf War of 1991. This military adventure seemed such a flagrant display of U.S. national hubris that it almost looked like an effort to expend surplus cold war military equipment! The final deployment of the Navy’s Iowa class battleships was the perfect illustration. It was as if A. T. Mahan was finally being interred, 100 years after writing “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History.” A moral imperative was now replacing the imperial imperative, in my mind. Nation states weren’t what they used to be – no more titanic struggles of opposing ideologies (Soviet Union: gone). Avoidance of war now seemed the primary goal of all advanced nations’ foreign policies. The march of history was clear. George W. Bush marched the opposite way with his invasion of Iraq in 2003, but otherwise it looked like the peacemakers had finally won the day.

Global capitalism may have been the foundation of this sea change in history. There were no significant national interests overriding the interests of multinational corporations. Their interest was profit, and profit meant trade, free from the uncertainties caused by war. There continued to be some asymmetrical conflicts, notably between the U.S. and various non-state actors (Al Qaeda and ISIS), but non-intervention by the larger nation states outside their own regions would be the rule. Russia may be an exception here, but she is primarily concerned with former Soviet states on her periphery.

And, that is the moral imperative, discovered only after spending the formative years of my life studying the cruelty waged against fellow humans in the name of power. War is simply wrong. Why waste one’s days studying it? “Neither shall they learn war anymore.”

The Russian Bear and 21^st Century Geopolitics

William Sundwick

Many of us are old enough to remember a mid-century exposure to national security, and the “way the world worked,” reinforced not just by the competition with the Soviet Union (“The Communists”), but also by our understanding of World War II, and modern world history, in general. 

The planet was divided into big geographic zones, and the Great Powers, throughout history, had always contested for control of these zones. This was what was called “geopolitics.” Both our high school social studies curricula and real national security policy (i.e., military contingency planning) were governed by geopolitical considerations in those days.

The roots of what we knew as geopolitics went back to the age of 19^th century European imperialism. The growth of capitalism in Europe and the United States required access to resources, both natural and human (labor). Nations with means could develop colonial empires to satisfy those needs. Much like the Roman Empire, inhabitants of any given location in the world had a choice of being dominated by a resource-rich Great Power, maintaining their independence through a successful defensive war with the Great Power, or striking a delicately balanced autonomy via alliances with one or another Great Power. This was, we thought, the way the world had worked through most of its history.

Mahan, Mackinder, and 20^th Century Geopolitics

The first writer to codify this world system was Alfred Thayer Mahan, a Captain in the U.S. Navy. He was a student of modern European history and published his monumental work, “The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783,” in 1890. Enormously influential throughout the imperialist world for the next hundred years, Mahan’s thesis was that free trade, hence access to those colonial resources (and markets), could only be secured by conscientious attention to control of the world ocean. If a Great Power cannot maintain that control, it will soon be reduced to merely regional importance … limited to overland communications channels. Ultimately, its masters will be those who can freely conduct trans-oceanic commerce with it. Mahan was a fan of the British Empire, and saw the United States, if it were to prioritize the building of an ocean-going navy, as clearly capable of the same level of greatness.

His views became accepted national strategy in the United States for nearly a century, and in Great Britain, albeit reluctantly, for at least half a century. It became the aspirational national strategy for the German Empire, leading Tirpitz to construct his “High Seas Fleet” to fight the British in the First World War. The other colonial empires -- France, Italy, and Japan -- also relied on sea power, but in a more minimalist way (“we’ll protect what is necessary, but we won’t compete for dominance on the world ocean”).

An alternative strategic paradigm emerged in Great Britain around the turn of the 20^th century. Its main proponent was Halford Mackinder, of the Royal Geographical Society. Mackinder published his paper “The Geographical Pivot of History” in 1904. He maintained that there was a world island, where most of the world’s population lived, not just a “world ocean” as Mahan observed. He was obsessed with overland communication through Eurasia, facilitated by railroads, whereas Mahan was impressed more by the development of steamships.

Mackinder’s pivot was based on a Mercator projection of the world, with its core (he called it the “heartland”) being north central Eurasia. This was an area dominated for at least 200 years by the Russian Empire, at the time symbolically depicted in European cartoons as a bear, crouching over that Eurasian land mass.

Russia didn’t even deserve a mention by Mahan! Being essentially land-locked, it would never achieve Great Power status, reasoned the U.S. Naval officer.

Mackinder believed that whoever could control this strategic center of the world island could ultimately control the world – control over sea lines of communication would naturally follow expansion out from the land-locked center, and include most great ports, for navigation. He explained the British Empire’s success in the previous century was due mostly to alliances with Russia (Crimean War notwithstanding?).

While Mahan overlooked Russia, Mackinder could be accused of overlooking the United States. He considered the Americas peripheral islands, part of an “outer crescent” … not central to the human drama. Nicholas Spykman, at Yale, attempted to synthesize the two competing geopolitical theories with his “Rimland” hypothesis. Rimland was comparable to Mackinder’s “inner marginal crescent” of central and western Europe, the Middle East, India, and Japan. He postulated (1942) that it was in this belt that control of the world truly rested. Unfortunately, the diversity of interests vying for dominance in those areas remain, today as much as in his time, way too fuzzy to generalize in a single geostrategic theory.

So, Mahan seems to imagine a world dominated from the sea, probably by the United States, astride its two protective oceans, and Mackinder envisions a central core of strength, dominated by Russia, with tentacles reaching out and ultimately encompassing the rest of the world. 20^th century geopolitics was dominated by one or the other of these competing theories.

Globalization and Geopolitics

But, something else happened in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether through explosive developments in telecommunications and information technology, or the worldwide acceptance of transnational control of capital, we appear to have entered a post-geopolitical age in the 21^st century. Neither Mahan nor Mackinder hold much sway in our current thinking.

Undeniably, most world citizens are concerned more with their own families and communities than they are with remote imperial (or capitalist) authority. It has always been so -- something conveniently ignored by all military geostrategic planning over the past two centuries. Save for proxy wars waged between the Western powers and Communist powers during the Cold War (Greece, Korea, Malaya, Vietnam), it seems that war between Great Powers has become obsolete.

Globalization allows an interconnected world to be easily influenced by advertising from any source -- so long as it is selling something desirable. Aspirations can be monetized, or related back to knowable cultural values of different populations. The age of global marketing, amplified by “big data,” is upon us.

The mountains, deserts, oceans -- geographic barriers for earlier geopolitical thinkers -- gone.

Globalization seems to have neutralized the imperialist ambitions of would-be Great Powers. If capital and labor can both move freely around the world, what good is imperialism? 

There remains one important caveat: capital and labor reside in different countries around the world, and those nation states have the power to pass and enforce laws restricting that free flow within and between nations. The polity in each sovereign nation still maintains some independence, even if the political leaders may have a financial stake in one transnational capitalist entity over another, their allegiance is seldom to another country, per se.

The state, then, persists. A new geopolitics emerges in the 21^st century, based on national political frameworks, and individual leaders’ ties, rather than features of physical geography. Cultural geography becomes predominant. And, economic geography separates the rich from the poor, within a given nation, as well as between them.

What About the Islamic State?

It is the combination of cultural and economic geography which enables entities like the Islamic State to gain a foothold. They rule by fear and intimidation. Their reach is enhanced, not by organized armies, but by the global Internet, and the ability to play upon cultural and economic sensibilities to “recruit” certain marginalized individuals to carry out terrorist attacks -- often in the heart of the former imperialist powers -- ostensibly to further the goals of the Islamic State.

The declared “War on Terror,” waged against these groups by the former imperialist powers, is an attempt to cast the struggle in geopolitical terms. Yet, the usual understanding of geopolitics doesn’t quite fit a semi-organized group holding a small, discontinuous, strip of territory in parts of Syria and Iraq. The Islamic State’s hold on the populations of the territories it occupies will always be weak.

Studies have indicated that, as horrifying as deadly terrorist attacks are, they have little impact on the real value of capital, worldwide (markets recover quickly). It is certainly not a “war”, in the geopolitical sense of the 19^th century colonial wars, or either World War of the 20^th century.  If global capitalism is the true “Great Power” of the 21^st century, it is not even fazed by terrorist groups like ISIS or Al Queda.

But, what of that cultural motivation? Affiliations with the world’s great religions are of great cultural consequence to many. And, if a group, terrorist or not, can successfully inspire large numbers of people, scattered throughout the world, by using cultural symbols, is that group not wielding geopolitical  power? There may be only a few thousand “members” of ISIS, but they can certainly get a lot of attention through terrorist acts! They are engaging in what nineteenth century European anarchists called “propaganda of the deed.”

Can it be that such acts will raise the political stature of the group, versus its competitors? In the case of ISIS, it could be following a systematic plan to make the populations of the former imperialist powers feel unsafe, unprotected by their own governments. In the case of a would-be Great Power (or former Great Power, like Russia?), might not an organized psy-ops plan aimed at disheartening the population of an adversary, causing it to lose confidence in its own government, accomplish a similar goal? This sort of action may well be a salient characteristic of the “new geopolitics.”

 Russian Psy-Ops

Imagining the possibilities of a coordinated Russian cyber-attack on U.S. and west European democratic institutions, following much recent speculation in the media, is clearly consistent with this new definition of geopolitics. And, Russia has a history of expansion which tends to support such methods. From the 15^th century onwards, the Principality of Moscow (Muscovy to the West) depended largely on the cunninig of its diplomats, combined with treachery and bribes, to cajole neighboring states into alliances, or vassal status.

It seldom resorted to war to accomplish its goals. Its primary early threats were from less organized armed bands of raiders, Tatars and Cossacks. Contrary to Mackinder’s thesis, the “heartland” of Russia never succeeded in subduing a power as well organized, and resourceful, as itself. It never conquered the Ottoman Empire, China, or Germany. Its expansion to the north and east was essentially expansion into a vacuum. In the case of the 18^th century partition of Poland, and the 20^th century emergence of Communist Parties throughout Europe, it sewed weakness and dissension within its rivals, leading to a favorable diplomatic outcome – ultimately, expansion of the Russian sphere of influence. At the culmination of the Soviet period, it had even produced its own follower of Mahan: Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who thought the time was ripe to pursue mastery of the world ocean. This, however, proved to be an unwelcome import from the West, very un-Russian. The Voennyi Morskoi Flot, built by Gorshkov, was left to rust in Russian ports after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 

But, a stealthy cyber-attack on the political process in the U.S. or France is entirely within the tradition of Russian history. It, in many ways, is the same old geopolitics of previous centuries, which the Russians have developed into a science. Let’s remember that Russia’s current oligarch-in-chief, Vladimir Putin, cut his professional teeth, before entering politics, as a practitioner of that scientific dark art of geopolitical strategy. He was a KGB agent. And, increasingly, it seems that his “useful idiot” in the White House is entirely naïve about this history.

We, in the United States, as well as the citizens of the EU, China, South America and all other countries in Mackinder’s inner and outer “marginal crescents” should be alert to the persistence of geopolitics from that former Great Power, the once-and-future imperial Russia.

Sometimes, a sense of “history interrupted” can be a powerful incentive for aggressive geopolitical action plans. We’ve seen several cases of this syndrome, over the last century, motivating profound political change. Vulnerable target populations were instrumental in the growth of European fascism after the humiliating defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, again in the “radicalization” of some segments of Islam who feel they were handed a raw deal by former colonial powers. And, some say that the humiliating toll of globalization on much of the world’s working poor is creating the same opportunity for a “history interrupted” movement.

Perhaps, it is even a motivator right here in the United States. Make America Great Again!