The Center Cannot Hold

A Primer for 21^st Century Political Labels

William Sundwick

Left and Right. It all started in 1789 with Louis XVI and his National Assembly. The body was reaction to the revolution that year, and the storming of the Bastille. The king knew he had to listen to people with differing views. The deputies supporting crown and church found themselves sitting together to the right of the Assembly President. Those who supported the revolution on the opposite side of the chamber, left of the President. The framework of this seating arrangement held in the Legislative Assembly of 1791, despite all new deputies.

The press picked up on the seating arrangement quickly. Soon everybody was talking about Le Droit and La Gauche in all discussions about the future direction of the monarchy. The coup d’etat of 1792, and the Terror following, emptied the right side of the chamber, when the Girondins , the more moderate of the Jacobins, were purged.  Survivors from that side moved closer to the Montagnards on the Left, but not quite with them, sitting closer to the Center of the chamber. That Center grew during the Thermador period (1794-95) and after the restoration of the monarchy in 1814-15.

Political clubs, then formal parties, emerged as the century progressed, over the objections of monarchists. A similar process had been underway in Britain since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, where Parliament emerged triumphant and immediately began to differentiate itself between “constitutionalism” and “divine right.” The Glorious Revolution also introduced another social and political philosophy into European history – liberalism. Inspired by John Locke, it established the notion of a “social contract” between the people and their ruler. Liberalism has remained the dominant philosophy for most western European governments, the United States and South America ever since.

In 19^th century America, however, a unique political structure developed. Slavery, and the compromises it necessitated, from the Constitutional Convention onward, made European political labels on any Left-Right spectrum difficult to apply. Our political structure has been charitably identified as “American Exceptionalism.” It reduced to two big themes: 1) slavery; and, 2) the frontier. Neither was an issue in Europe. Ending slavery required a violent Civil War, which only replaced it with the demi-slavery of Jim Crow and white supremacy. And, the existence of an empty frontier throughout the century made escape from political labels too easy! Our compromised political system might be described as “centrist,” accommodating both white supremacy and the liberal ideal of self-determination.

Liberalism in the United States became associated more with property rights than social equity. Abolitionists were not liberals, but radicals. In Europe, Marx and Engels created a Left for the industrial revolution, but wrote a series of articles for the New York Tribune before the Civil War where they identify a peculiar American strain of class conflict, literally between slaves and their masters.

Since the frontier was rural – not urban industrial – it was naturally attractive to the aspiring “petty bourgeois” of independent farmers and artisans. That was not the milieu of Britain’s growing textile industry, familiar to Engels, where workers controlling the means of production would lead to “socialism.” The struggle for socialism  would adopt a more European complexion. Not American.

Yet, by the end of the century, America had managed to create a movement of rural “populists,” who later joined with urban workers in a “progressive” coalition led by disaffected members of an elite capitalist class (William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette). Progressivism expanded the liberal idea of property rights to workers, perhaps not in Marx’s terms of “seizing the means of production,” but still making great strides toward establishing “social rights.” From the Civil War through the first two decades of the 20^th century, it was the progressive Republican Party, more than Eugene Debs’ socialists, that spearheaded the closest approximation to left politics the country had known up until that time. Progressivism’s purpose was clearly to save capitalism, not destroy it. Likewise, FDR’s New Deal.

American political labels began including the term “conservative” in the mid-20^th century. While certain cultural drivers had always existed in the U.S., as in Europe, toward traditionalism, primacy of property rights, and religious freedom, people who felt these drivers most strongly still found themselves in the broader European liberal tradition -- until that conservative brand was invented by William F. Buckley and others. Robert Taft emerged as the Republican Party symbol of conservatism, not Dwight Eisenhower (a military man averse to political labels and perhaps still tied to the midwestern populists, or progressive wing of his party).

This spiffy new brand of conservatism captured the imagination (and wallets) of media influencers, including television, convincing people that Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was defending our democracy against an insidious plot of Soviet Communism. McCarthy was a Taft Republican who exploited the fears many average Americans held for the “other.” Communists made a convenient other. Richard Nixon was a McCarthy acolyte, and Ronald Reagan gave the hysteria some slick Hollywood PR.

The hysteria faded but still left a mark on political labels. There had never been a strong identification with socialism, or anything smacking of the Left, in U.S. politics. Even labor unions eschewed the label. We remained a Centrist nation as McCarthy and, later, the John Birch Society, were discredited. More people began to see some value in the concept of “social rights” – now expressed as “civil rights.” It was the new face of liberalism. John F. Kennedy was elected, then Lyndon Johnson.

But, alas, American political compromise with the Right was still necessary. Just as it had been with slavery from the birth of the Republic.  The cultural divide between regions, between urban and rural, between religious and secular, could not be eradicated. “Socialist” remained a nasty word. It was popularly associated with communism. You could safely call yourself only “liberal” or “Democrat,” never socialist, in public. We were still a Centrist nation.

Even after Nixon’s humiliation and resignation, we merely advanced to Reagan. Jimmy Carter campaigned in 1976 from the center. Bill Clinton and his Third Way responded to Reaganism by stripping the Democratic Party of any vestiges of social rights. After two terms of Barack Obama, one might think it was time for the Party to feel more comfortable moving left. Apparently not. Donald Trump managed to squeak out an electoral college win over Hillary Clinton in 2016. And, now everybody on the putative political left is convinced that Obama could have done more, save for the country remaining “moderate” – i.e., Centrist. Sigh.

The ”establishment” in the Democratic Party, which includes Speaker Nancy Pelosi, is now identified as “neoliberal”– meaning, generally, that they believe in capitalism and the primacy of markets. They are not socialists. ONLY Bernie Sanders claims that label. And, we all know he will never be president.

We live in a shrinking “flat” world. Yes, it is governed by neoliberal capitalist interests. Those of us who want to change that must accept the widest possible spread from left to right of center in that chamber where we all sit. Imagine it is Paris, 1789. Parties have not been established. We all have our opinions, and we should understand where they come from. We should own them. Left, Right, and Center all have their place in our National Assembly. Even if the Center, changing its positions over time, always holds in the end!

Green New Deal

Where Did it Come From? Where Is it Going?

William Sundwick

The Green New Deal was not invented by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Although it was introduced by her and Sen. Ed Markey as a pair of resolutions in the 116^th Congress, the origins of the concept (and the name) go back at least ten years.

Thomas Friedman used the term in a New York Times column in 2007. He was discussing the need to institute major structural reforms of the American (and world) economy if there were to be any hope of “greening” the future. He saw it mostly concerning the electric grid, but still made the case that it couldn’t happen without a massive public investment comparable to the project of the New Deal 75 years earlier.

In 2012, Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein promoted the same name, using it for the party’s platform. That platform also called for major structural reforms in all western economies, combined with an “economic bill of rights” for the large number of workers who would likely be displaced. It claimed to owe its origins to other “Green New Deal” programs of European Green Parties.

These earlier proponents, like Ocasio-Cortez, believed that the power of established corporate elites in local and national institutions was so great that the force of law (as well as incentive) was needed to counteract it. More moderate carbon-trading schemes, and free market pressures, could not begin to deal with the scope of the problem.

The scope of the problem is reflected in the current GND proposal. Its three pillars introduced in early 2019, and further elaborated by the new think tank, Data for Progress, are:

1)      decarbonization

2)      jobs

3)      justice.

The latest IPCC report from the United Nations now says that serious decarbonization worldwide is necessary over the next twelve years, or global warming above 1.5 degrees Celsius will be unavoidable. Catastrophic climate effects would result (more violent storms, sea level rise, drought, famine, fires). Research into decarbonization technology needs a significant boost, quickly, to help. And, carbon taxes, incentives for renewables, all are required -- even investment in nuclear energy.

 The challenge also entails displacement of jobs for everybody who earns their living in the fossil fuel and factory farming sectors. Thus, job creation and retraining must be a significant part of any GND program, including a jobs guarantee to get the necessary political support for the disruption.

Finally, justice must be served by ensuring maximum equitability for impacts of climate change. The bad effects shouldn’t fall disproportionately on marginalized, poor communities.

While there are definite technological challenges facing decarbonization, most critics agree that the greatest challenge is political. And, the core of the political opposition seems to be either fear of who will be hurt, or fear that we just can’t afford to pay for decarbonization. The jobs and justice components of GND are meant to address the first fear, and a new economic theory catching fire among left-oriented economists at many institutions called Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) is meant to address the second fear – “how do we pay for it?”

The basic idea behind MMT is that our government (at least the U.S.) prints its own money! There is NOT a finite supply of money. National debt is a myth, and the sole purpose of national accounts statistics is to measure social benefit. Most supporters of the GND are also supporters of MMT. But, even without reliance on the still controversial economic theory, there is accounting based on opportunity costs – what does it cost society to do nothing?

So, Green New Deal proponents have a battalion of economists, social theorists, climate scientists, and historians of 20^th century America, to support their program. But do they have people in leadership roles in Congress (or the Executive Branch)? Right now, that seems to be a major tactical hurdle. Famously, Sen. Diane Feinstein (a very senior Democrat, who thinks she knows best) harangued a gathering of school children representing the Sunrise Movement (Ocasio-Cortez’ youth movement promoting the GND) outside her office. And, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, when asked what her position would be on the formation of a Select Committee on the Green New Deal, disparagingly referred to the “Green Whatever,” saying she would not support such a committee.

We all know what the White House position on climate change is -- denial. Indeed, the Republican Party is now almost uniformly falling in line behind the White House position. Markey’s resolution failed in a 57-0 vote in the Senate.

What is the way forward? Certainly, elections must count for something. And, public enthusiasm is clearly on the pro-GND side. But the opposition will not go away. Grass roots lobbying of Members must be a nationwide activity. They should want to be on the right side of history. And, their constituents have children and grandchildren who will be on the receiving end of the worst climate effects. It should not be necessary to rely on children, themselves, to make the case. (I’m sure the Sunrise Movement, with some justification, thought the kids would be sympathetic for media coverage at Feinstein’s office).

Part of the opposition to the Green New Deal Resolution is the obvious guiding role played by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (with Bernie Sanders as an early co-sponsor). She has ties to Democratic Socialists of America (DSA); i.e., like Bernie, an avowed socialist. This is still problematical in American politics – across party lines. Is the whole plan really nothing more than a roadmap to socialism? Does that make it a scam, invented solely for that purpose? Many of its supporters have indicated, explicitly or implicitly, that yes, it is just that! Capitalism and the future of the planet are simply incompatible, they assert.

Final question, then: what does all this portend for the future of the program, after 2020? Does the “socialist” label matter that much? Whatever you may think of the merits of the specific Ocasio-Cortez/Markey resolutions, it comes down to being, intentionally or not, a referendum on the role of socialism, of radical government activism, in American democracy.

American Politics for the 21^st Century

Making the Old New Again

William Sundwick

Something has happened to the American political order in the last few years – both before and since the last Presidential election. Neither major political party is “your father’s” Democratic or Republican Party. Partisans in both parties are convinced that the nation they were taught to love and cherish is in grave danger. Yet, no clear signs of a path forward are visible. Is the reality of party politics so different from past elections? Or, are differences merely more amplified now, since the political center seems to have collapsed? How much time do we have to get our house in order? Does it even matter? And, if it does, what can we do?

I maintain that it does matter, and time is short enough that we must begin now to cement our legacy. We need to prepare the next generation of Americans for their ultimate responsibility -- saving the Republic!

What happened?

It’s a fuzzy timeline, but sometime during the Carter administration (late ‘70s), the Democratic Party started its long, slow disintegration. At first, it was mostly about Democratic voters disenchanted with a lot of semi-amateurish pols clumsy at maneuvering the machinery of government and diplomacy (Hamilton Jordan, Zbigniew Brzezinksi).  Only when Carter lost his re-election bid, after a primary challenge from Ted Kennedy, did it become clear that bad things were happening in the Party. Ronald Reagan was given the undeserved gift of an opposition increasingly embroiled in its own internal dissensions. Those only increased in intensity through the 1980s. A three-way election in 1992 allowed the ultimate Democratic assassin, Bill Clinton, to emerge as the unlikely party leader. His “Third Way” centrist cabal, touted as the Democratic Party of the “future,” amounted to the Party’s surrender of principles going back to the New Deal and Great Society.

Meanwhile, a new ideology was growing in America. It was an ideology from the right. As the Cold War waned, all those John Birch Society anti-communist hawks needed a new target. They had money, mostly from oil. Their money was behind Goldwater in the sixties, too, but wasn’t as well-organized then. The Koch brothers became the new czars of the movement. They bought influence and politicians. They even bought academic institutions (like the Libertarian economics department at George Mason University here in Virginia).

Simultaneously, perhaps due to some of the same money (no evidence here – just my conspiracy theory), many religious denominations -- including factions of the College of Cardinals -- found success by touting fundamentalist, very conservative social interpretations of America. Protestants called themselves “Evangelical” – as in spreading the Gospel – but were, in fact, spreading a quite different theology than other Christian and Jewish religious traditions.

Both groups shared a common seething anger at the established social order. They became obsessed with a radical “burn the house down” apocalyptic vision. Only true believers would be lifted up in the “shining city on the hill” that President Reagan referenced. The others be damned!

Thus, the conservative “revolution” had two legs – Libertarian-oriented billions from the Koch’s and others, and devoted religious followers of many denominations, especially in the heartland and the South. Only the third leg was missing -- an appealing messenger. Reagan was soothing, George W. Bush was folksy – but, it took Donald Trump to make the message visceral!

Hadn’t Obama’s two terms undone any of this? Nope. He, and the Democratic Party, were far too devoted to compromise. His “Kumbaya moments” with Republicans continued to seal the fate of progressivism in the Democratic Party that began in the Clinton years.

Are We Really in Decline?

Many Americans are in a political funk these days. They feel separated from the power structure and are resentful of it. Democracy as an ideology seems to be in decline– not just in the U.S., but around the world. Much of it has to do with the colossal growth in the power of multinational corporations. They seem to be a higher sovereignty than the nations that host them. And, they are not necessarily public, either.  They may be closely held, even family owned. The Trump Organization and Kushner family enterprises are not atypical around the world. Still, much of the world’s population is now focusing its hopes and aspirations on these corporate powers, not their own country. It’s called “globalization.” And, it has its own political ideology – known as “neoliberalism.” Neoliberals have no national allegiances, but only worship the global market. True enough, this ideology promotes international peace, but tends to exacerbate class and race warfare. It may even have created a counter-ideology, “neo-Marxism,”

While much of the world is now experiencing a great expansion of their economies, largely because of the new global order, it’s notable that they are mostly countries with non-white populations (not Europeans and white Americans). Racial conflict ensues. White folks don’t generally have rising expectations these days.

But, if we remain objective about the world’s condition, we must acknowledge that the bulk of the world population improving its lives is a net plus, right? It’s just that in a zero-sum game some will be losers. Even if it’s not a zero-sum game, people may be hard to convince. After all, their own experience hasn’t given them much hope, lately. Also, powerful interests outside the global power structure want to take advantage of these fears. They include some members of the military class, who would benefit from armed conflict, some religious groups who would also benefit from that “us vs. them” rubric, and political demagogues who win by inflaming the emotions of self-perceived “losers.”

American politics is now at the point where we need to give a sober assessment of what we really want to preserve about our society. Is it participatory democracy? Civil and human rights? Freedom of expression? We may need some targeted priorities for the next few election cycles.

Whatever happened to third parties in America?

Politics in the United States has been dominated by two parties since the earliest days of the Republic. When either of the two main parties loses too often, so that a large portion of their supporters feels they must leave, third parties emerge. This happened to the Federalists, who died and were replaced by Whigs, who later cast off their anti-abolitionist constituencies and emerged as Republicans. Socialists, influenced by Marx and others, popped up in the late 19^th century, then were co-opted by Democrats in the New Deal era.

In the mid-twentieth century, a traditionally Democratic constituency of white folks in the South (Democrats since Andrew Jackson) split off from the New Deal national Democratic Party when it became too concerned about racial equality. Dixiecrats, and George Wallace’s American Independent Party, were third parties until co-opted by Nixon’s national Republican Party.

Meanwhile, other Republicans, alienated by this new direction in their party, bolted to form a Libertarian Party (in 1992, Pierrot’s Independent presidential bid was Libertarian without the name). Ralph Nader formed a Green Party for the 2000 election, which never achieved a coherent ideology, mostly co-opted by the Democrats.

 Depending on the strength of the group bolting from the major party, the third parties either replace the old party, or are co-opted by a major party. This is American political history. The 2016 election campaign was another chapter in this saga. The Republican Party was captured by an outsider, who had no long association with the Party, and the Democratic Party was once again rent by internal disaffection. The ultimate losing formula for them was the product of a bitter primary fight – reminiscent of the 1980 rift between the “Carterites” and “Kennedyites.” In both cases, the strength of the insurgents was enough to sap the ultimate nominee of the support needed to win. The Republican Party had the good sense to avoid such open warfare -- the “NeverTrumpians” voices didn’t rise to the same pitch as the Democrats’ divisions.

Now, Donald Trump’s Party, despite being only the party of white people, commands all those who wear the Republican label. It is not too fringy, nor too racist, nor too extreme by any measure, if you are intent upon avoiding voting for a Democrat. There are no significant third parties in America today.

The Wave Theory of Politics

Americans like divided government, checks and balances seem to have historical appeal. That’s why off-year midterm elections generally favor the opposition party. Voters don’t have enough trust in either party to put all their eggs in that one basket. In recent memory, 1986, 1994, 2006, 2010 and 2014 all support this hypothesis. 

The idea of a pendulum swinging, always seeking equilibrium – the middle ground – works in physics but is questionable in politics. The alternate model of politics is that the pendulum swings proportional to force applied, not necessarily seeking the middle. It’s not gravity that determines its motion. This model allows for anger and frustration of voters, and simple boredom -- what do we have to lose? Let’s burn it down and see what happens!

Which model you choose depends on your assessment of how much time we have. If we are racing toward the Apocalypse, putting a finger in the dike may have limited value. But, if we place our faith in social engineering solutions -- tuning here and tweaking there -- we may avert the total collapse of civilization, even if forced to choose which features we really care about saving. Planetary disasters from climate change, mass extinctions, and nuclear war may be avoidable with the proper attention to engineering, either technological or social.

Then, there is the position of social resignation, the apocalyptic vision. Yes, civilization as we know it may come to an end sooner rather than later, but in the fullness of God’s plan, something will replace it. All empires have finite lifespans– the Roman Empire lasted only about 400 years, the British Empire barely 200. How much more time can we reasonably expect for the American Empire? We typically see American Evangelical Protestants subscribing to this position but insist THEY will be the ones to prevail in the end.

The youngsters

When I look at the world, and especially American politics, I see a future populated by people younger than me. I see my kids in charge. I think they have what it takes to make that old optimism new again. Their idealism surpasses my own. It comes from knowing what they want, and how things should be, and in part from their innocence. That’s not a bad thing. Their clarity of vision correctly identifies obfuscation as an excuse for compromise.

I’ve seen them in action in political campaigns. They are willing to put in the hours and the shoe leather needed for grassroots support of candidates they believe in. Of course, all this is subject to change once they find themselves in power. Compromising their principles will become a matter of survival, and quid pro quo arrangements will sap their youthful energy. Getting their candidate into office may prove to be a lesser challenge than staying there!

But, still, their values appear to be those I’m proudest to pass on. After all, they have a lot more at stake in the future than I do!

  Cognitive Revolution to Homo Deus

Yuval Harari’s View of History

William Sundwick

Inspired by Jared Diamond’s 1997 best seller Guns, Germs, and Steel, 35-year-old Israeli history professor Yuval Noah Harari published his first book, Sapiens, a brief history of Humankind (2011 in Hebrew, English edition 2014). He, like Diamond, takes a long view of human history – starting his story with the event which occurred about 70,000 years ago. He dubs it the “cognitive revolution.”  It resulted in the replacement of Homo Neanderthalis by the species Homo Sapiens. Harari maintains Sapiens possessed the unique ability to use imagination, to depict abstract ideas, and to create a narrative (not the same as signaling, common to many animal species). Notwithstanding recent dating of some cave “art” (mostly orderly lines and hash marks) as coming from Neanderthals, only Sapiens could sit around a fire and relate stories to family or hunter-gatherer band, says Harari.

The ability to create a narrative, in turn, facilitated cooperation in much larger groups, ultimately leading to settlements, villages, and agriculture. Villages grew into tribes, then kingdoms, then empires. Gods were invented to give order to the world, priests were created to enforce the rules made by those gods.

In his second book, Homo Deus, a Brief History of Tomorrow, Harari focuses more on what we have come to know as “civilization.” He recounts mankind’s journey from God-and-Nation centrism to the triumph in the late 20^th century of “liberal humanism” (or simply, “liberalism”) nearly everywhere. Humanism itself was a creation of the old order, as God was taken as the facilitator of human empowerment. It was really technology, in Harari’s view, that enabled this development. The modern age, the age of science, has now replaced the God of the old order with the notion of progress. In the 21^st century, Harari claims, not only God, but nation-states, and even capitalism, will gradually succumb to a world controlled by algorithms – smarter than any humans, yet created by them. Including bioengineering (CRISPR), Harari thinks these technological advances will, by century’s end, mean the beginning of the end of Homo Sapiens, much as the cognitive revolution 70,000 years ago spelled doom to Neanderthals. Meanwhile, though, we’ve had a good run. He calls our replacement “homo deus,” man with godlike powers.

Harari is a vegan, he cares as much about animal consciousness as human -- and believes that industrial animal farming is essentially a holocaust. His realization that there is no accepted scientific definition of “consciousness” is what led him to the animal rights position. He believes that animals cannot be dismissed as less-than-conscious beings, leading directly to his doubts about the durability of humanism. If you accept the principle that God and religion were invented by man, and religious authority always has been interpreted by humans to advance their own agenda, it is not difficult to understand his position.

Enter the algorithm. Harari posits that there are organic and inorganic algorithms. Biological entities are organic algorithms, machines are inorganic. But, they are all algorithmic -- they follow mathematical and physical laws. The universe, in the scientific world view, is composed of algorithms.

What about morality? Ethical principles can survive in a world controlled by algorithms, says Harari. But, we do not yet know how to design an algorithm that would allow a driverless car to swerve to avoid hitting pedestrians, even though it would kill its occupant. Is its occupant the “owner?” That may be the critical question. Does ownership of the algorithm convey property rights which supersede the right-to-life and happiness of any conscious beings using the algorithm? We’re stuck with the humanist dilemma.

Right to happiness, of course, is nothing that Sapiens has been especially vigilant at protecting – even in the modern age. Harari claims that there is no evidence that modern humans are any “happier” than primitive hunter-gatherers. They may live longer, they certainly have more stuff, but are they happier? Like consciousness, happiness is without scientific definition. As to the triumph of liberal humanism, it has created a more peaceful world. Fewer humans die violent deaths than in times past. And, Harari claims there is much evidence to support that modern man is less oppressed than in earlier ages, due largely to humanism. But, for all we know, pre-agricultural societies may still have the edge in “happiness.” 

Looking to the future, Harari foresees the creation of a “useless class” who are not only unemployed, but unemployable. He expects this group to be very large by mid-century. The culprit is mostly artificial intelligence, which will become so advanced as to reverse the history of technological change. Whereas in the past, technology always created more new opportunities for employment than jobs lost, the story of the 21^st century may be different. Unlike the loom, the steam engine, or even the computer, AI will ultimately render the entire human race redundant. First to go will be human labor as an economic engine. Already, our growing inequality speaks to the declining value of human labor in the formation of capital. This economic truth is what has led to the downfall of socialist humanism, as opposed to liberal humanism.  Workers, even collectively, can’t compete with other means of creating capital – economists call what happens on Wall Street “rent-seeking” – not production in the classic Marxian sense.

Only religious and political enforcement of “individual liberty” (the foundation of liberalism) continues to work in the interests of human beings. What happens when we lose our sense of “self” to the all-powerful algorithm? Individuals become completely predictable. They may continue to be customers, but their consumer behavior, and voting patterns, will be precisely manipulated by the algorithm. No more mysterious “self,” no more “soul.” The species then dies. It will be replaced by a partially organic, partially inorganic, algorithm, which can be sentient, or not, depending on the needs of evolutionary design and the environment.

“Techno-humanism” may be the path forward. If we sapiens can successfully harness the new technology so it remains the servant, rather than master, of our species. A strong ethical imperative may still undergird it. But, more likely, and more ominous, claims Harari, is a new religion he calls “Dataism.” This will replace humanism with belief in the data stream, a supra-conscious entity of which we are all part -- cogs in the eternal flow, as it were. His final question: where are ethics and morality in such a religion?

Read, and absorb message. Some facts a little questionable, but thrust remains on target. The future belongs to the left!