Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Monday, September 4, 2017
Friday, May 26, 2017
The Russian Bear and 21st
Century Geopolitics
William Sundwick
Many of us are old enough to remember a mid-century exposure
to national security, and the “way the world worked,” reinforced not just by
the competition with the Soviet Union (“The Communists”), but also by our understanding
of World War II, and modern world history, in general.
The planet was divided into big geographic zones, and the
Great Powers, throughout history, had always contested for control of these
zones. This was what was called “geopolitics.” Both our
high school social studies curricula and real national security policy (i.e.,
military contingency planning) were governed by geopolitical considerations in
those days.
The roots of what we knew as geopolitics went back to the
age of 19th century European imperialism. The growth of capitalism
in Europe and the United States required access to resources, both natural and
human (labor). Nations with means could develop colonial empires to satisfy
those needs. Much like the Roman Empire, inhabitants of any given location in
the world had a choice of being dominated by a resource-rich Great Power,
maintaining their independence through a successful defensive war with the
Great Power, or striking a delicately balanced autonomy via alliances with one
or another Great Power. This was, we thought, the way the world had worked
through most of its history.
Mahan, Mackinder, and 20th Century Geopolitics
The first writer to codify this world system was Alfred Thayer Mahan,
a Captain in the U.S. Navy. He was a student of modern European history and
published his monumental work, “The Influence of Sea Power on History,
1660-1783,” in 1890. Enormously influential throughout the imperialist world
for the next hundred years, Mahan’s thesis was that free trade, hence access to
those colonial resources (and markets), could only be secured by conscientious
attention to control of the world ocean.
If a Great Power cannot maintain that control, it will soon be reduced to
merely regional importance … limited to overland communications channels.
Ultimately, its masters will be those who can freely conduct trans-oceanic
commerce with it. Mahan was a fan of the British Empire, and saw the United
States, if it were to prioritize the building of an ocean-going navy, as
clearly capable of the same level of greatness.
His views became accepted national strategy in the United
States for nearly a century, and in Great Britain, albeit reluctantly, for at
least half a century. It became the aspirational national strategy for the
German Empire, leading Tirpitz to construct his “High Seas Fleet” to fight the
British in the First World War. The other colonial empires -- France, Italy,
and Japan -- also relied on sea power, but in a more minimalist way (“we’ll protect
what is necessary, but we won’t compete for dominance on the world ocean”).
An alternative strategic paradigm emerged in Great Britain around
the turn of the 20th century. Its main proponent was Halford
Mackinder, of the Royal Geographical Society. Mackinder published his paper “The
Geographical Pivot of History” in 1904. He maintained that there was a world island, where most of the world’s
population lived, not just a “world ocean” as Mahan observed. He was obsessed
with overland communication through Eurasia, facilitated by railroads, whereas
Mahan was impressed more by the development of steamships.
Mackinder’s pivot was based on a Mercator projection of the
world, with its core (he called it the “heartland”) being north central Eurasia.
This was an area dominated for at least 200 years by the Russian Empire, at the
time symbolically depicted in European cartoons as a bear, crouching over that
Eurasian land mass.
Russia didn’t even deserve a mention by Mahan! Being
essentially land-locked, it would never achieve Great Power status, reasoned
the U.S. Naval officer.
Mackinder believed that whoever could control this strategic
center of the world island could ultimately control the world – control over
sea lines of communication would naturally follow expansion out from the
land-locked center, and include most great ports, for navigation. He explained
the British Empire’s success in the previous century was due mostly to alliances
with Russia (Crimean War notwithstanding?).
While Mahan overlooked Russia, Mackinder could be accused of
overlooking the United States. He considered the Americas peripheral islands, part
of an “outer crescent” … not central to the human drama. Nicholas Spykman, at
Yale, attempted to synthesize the two competing geopolitical theories with his
“Rimland” hypothesis.
Rimland was comparable to Mackinder’s “inner marginal crescent” of central and
western Europe, the Middle East, India, and Japan. He postulated (1942) that it
was in this belt that control of the world truly rested. Unfortunately, the
diversity of interests vying for dominance in those areas remain, today as much
as in his time, way too fuzzy to generalize in a single geostrategic theory.
So, Mahan seems to imagine a world dominated from the sea,
probably by the United States, astride its two protective oceans, and Mackinder
envisions a central core of strength, dominated by Russia, with tentacles
reaching out and ultimately encompassing the rest of the world. 20th
century geopolitics was dominated by one or the other of these competing
theories.
Globalization and Geopolitics
But, something else happened in the second half of the
twentieth century. Whether through explosive developments in telecommunications
and information technology, or the worldwide acceptance of transnational
control of capital, we appear to have entered a post-geopolitical age in the 21st century. Neither Mahan
nor Mackinder hold much sway in our current thinking.
Undeniably, most world citizens are concerned more with
their own families and communities than they are with remote imperial (or
capitalist) authority. It has always been so -- something conveniently ignored
by all military geostrategic planning over the past two centuries. Save for proxy
wars waged between the Western powers and Communist powers during the Cold War
(Greece, Korea, Malaya, Vietnam), it seems that war between Great Powers has
become obsolete.
Globalization allows an interconnected world to be easily
influenced by advertising from any source -- so long as it is selling something
desirable. Aspirations can be monetized, or related back to knowable cultural
values of different populations. The age of global marketing, amplified by “big
data,” is upon us.
The mountains, deserts, oceans -- geographic barriers for
earlier geopolitical thinkers -- gone.
Globalization seems to have neutralized the imperialist
ambitions of would-be Great Powers. If capital and labor can both move freely
around the world, what good is imperialism?
There remains one important caveat: capital and labor reside
in different countries around the
world, and those nation states have the power to pass and enforce laws
restricting that free flow within and between nations. The polity in each sovereign
nation still maintains some independence, even if the political leaders may
have a financial stake in one transnational capitalist entity over another,
their allegiance is seldom to another
country, per se.
The state, then, persists. A new geopolitics emerges in the
21st century, based on national political frameworks, and individual
leaders’ ties, rather than features of physical geography. Cultural geography
becomes predominant. And, economic geography separates the rich from the poor,
within a given nation, as well as between them.
What About the Islamic State?
It is the combination of cultural and economic geography
which enables entities like the Islamic State to gain a foothold. They rule by
fear and intimidation. Their reach is enhanced, not by organized armies, but by
the global Internet, and the ability to play upon cultural and economic
sensibilities to “recruit” certain marginalized individuals to carry out
terrorist attacks -- often in the heart of the former imperialist powers --
ostensibly to further the goals of the Islamic State.
The declared “War on Terror,” waged against these groups by
the former imperialist powers, is an attempt to cast the struggle in
geopolitical terms. Yet, the usual understanding of geopolitics doesn’t quite
fit a semi-organized group holding a small, discontinuous, strip of territory
in parts of Syria and Iraq. The Islamic State’s hold on the populations of the
territories it occupies will always be weak.
Studies
have indicated that, as horrifying as deadly terrorist attacks are, they
have little impact on the real value of capital, worldwide (markets recover
quickly). It is certainly not a “war”, in the geopolitical sense of the 19th
century colonial wars, or either World War of the 20th century. If global capitalism is the true “Great
Power” of the 21st century, it is not even fazed by terrorist groups
like ISIS or Al Queda.
But, what of that cultural motivation? Affiliations with the
world’s great religions are of great cultural consequence to many. And, if a
group, terrorist or not, can successfully inspire large numbers of people,
scattered throughout the world, by using cultural symbols, is that group not
wielding geopolitical power? There may
be only a few thousand “members” of ISIS, but they can certainly get a lot of
attention through terrorist
acts! They are engaging in what nineteenth century European anarchists
called “propaganda
of the deed.”
Can it be that such acts will raise the political stature of
the group, versus its competitors? In the case of ISIS, it could be following a
systematic plan to make the populations of the former imperialist powers feel
unsafe, unprotected by their own governments. In the case of a would-be Great
Power (or former Great Power, like Russia?),
might not an organized psy-ops
plan aimed at disheartening the population of an adversary, causing it to lose
confidence in its own government, accomplish a similar goal? This sort of action
may well be a salient characteristic of the “new geopolitics.”
Imagining the possibilities of a coordinated Russian
cyber-attack on U.S. and west European democratic institutions, following much recent
speculation in the media, is clearly consistent with this new definition of
geopolitics. And, Russia has a history
of expansion which tends to support such methods. From the 15th
century onwards, the Principality of Moscow (Muscovy to the West) depended
largely on the cunninig of its diplomats, combined with treachery and bribes,
to cajole neighboring states into alliances, or vassal status.
It seldom resorted to war to accomplish its goals. Its
primary early threats were from less organized armed bands of raiders, Tatars
and Cossacks. Contrary to Mackinder’s thesis, the “heartland” of Russia never
succeeded in subduing a power as well organized, and resourceful, as itself. It
never conquered the Ottoman Empire, China, or Germany. Its expansion to the
north and east was essentially expansion into a vacuum. In the case of the 18th
century partition of Poland, and the 20th century emergence of
Communist Parties throughout Europe, it sewed weakness and dissension within
its rivals, leading to a favorable
diplomatic outcome – ultimately, expansion of the Russian sphere of
influence. At the culmination of the Soviet period, it had even produced its
own follower of Mahan: Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who thought the time was ripe
to pursue mastery of the world ocean. This, however, proved to be an unwelcome
import from the West, very un-Russian. The Voennyi
Morskoi Flot, built by Gorshkov, was left to rust in Russian ports after
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
But, a stealthy cyber-attack
on the political process in the U.S. or France is entirely within the tradition
of Russian history. It, in many ways, is the same old geopolitics of previous
centuries, which the Russians have developed into a science. Let’s remember
that Russia’s current oligarch-in-chief, Vladimir Putin, cut his professional teeth,
before entering politics, as a practitioner of that scientific dark art of
geopolitical strategy. He was a KGB agent. And, increasingly, it seems that his
“useful idiot” in the White House is entirely naïve about this history.
We, in the United States, as well as the citizens of the EU,
China, South America and all other countries in Mackinder’s inner and outer
“marginal crescents” should be alert to the persistence of geopolitics from that
former Great Power, the once-and-future imperial Russia.
Sometimes, a sense of “history interrupted” can be a
powerful incentive for aggressive geopolitical action plans. We’ve seen several
cases of this syndrome, over the last century, motivating profound political
change. Vulnerable target populations were instrumental in the growth of
European fascism after the humiliating defeat of the Central Powers in World
War I, again in the “radicalization” of some segments of Islam who feel they were
handed a raw deal by former colonial powers. And, some say that the humiliating
toll of globalization on much of the world’s working poor is creating the same opportunity
for a “history interrupted” movement.
Perhaps, it is even a motivator right here in the United
States. Make America Great Again!
Labels:
Alfred Thayer Mahan,
capital,
geopolitics,
globalization,
Halford Mackinder,
heartland theory,
history,
imperialism,
Islamic State,
national security,
politics,
Russia,
sea power,
strategy,
terrorism,
Vladimir Putin
Thursday, May 11, 2017
Anarchism: Libertarian,
Socialist, or Just Crazy?
William Sundwick
What is anarchism? Since the mid-19th century, it
has been defined as a political philosophy which is basically anti-statist,
with the same Greek root as “anarchy.” It holds that the human spirit is throttled,
never aided, by the various mechanisms of the state … including even local
authorities acting as agents of the state. Liberty, justice, equality can only
be achieved through strictly voluntary
associations between individuals or groups, never through compulsion.
Through history, from the origins of the movement to the
present day, we see some very negative associations for anarchists and
anarchism. Hence, many of its followers have avoided the label, calling
themselves libertarians, or socialists of various stripes, instead. In fact,
these more neutral sounding labels are older than the term anarchism , in English. That does
not mean anarchism died out, a momentary blip on the radar screen of political
theory without much substance. Indeed, it has been central to the thinking of
most left-wing movements ever since it was invented by Pierre Joseph Proudhon,
about 1840, with the publication of his book, “What is Property?” The right, as
well, has embraced some clearly anarchist thinking in its distrust of government
institutions.
The First Anarchist
Proudhon was the first self-proclaimed “anarchist,” but the
term had appeared in English as early as the Civil War of the 1640s, where
royalists accused roundheads of being anarchists. Proudhon believed that
“property is theft.” He wrote that inheritance of property, or any ownership of
capital, was an intrinsic evil (he made an exception for personal property, the
distinction being much clearer in the 19th century). His philosophy
was that all social interaction regarding property should be based on mutually
agreement. Although he first called himself a socialist, and approved of Karl
Marx’ “Communist Manifesto” (1848), he saw one glaring flaw in Marx – he declared
in the Manifesto that the liberation of workers would be accomplished via the
state. It was up to workers to stage a coup so they could, in effect, BECOME
the state! Marx was a statist. Proudhon said no, this will not work. All
members of society need to cooperate
in endeavors which are of mutual benefit
to all parties. His philosophy became known as “mutualism,” and has maintained a base among
many anarchist thinkers ever since.
Crazy Germans
Proudhon was a slightly older (and wiser?) contemporary of
Marx; but, arising in Europe at the time was a diverse group of
“anarcho-socialist” thinkers. Being intellectuals, they could not agree among
themselves on much of anything. They may have been followers of Marx who disagreed
on certain assertions in his writings, or a younger generation who felt no
compunction to follow Marx at all.
In Germany, an early contemporary of Marx was Max Stirner,
a proponent of “egoism” – the idea that the individual was supreme, owing no
allegiance to any higher authority. In fact, all acts of the state to reduce individual
freedom were inherently coercive. Does this sound familiar to Americans of a libertarian
bent? One can easily extrapolate tax resistance, armed standoffs with federal
“revenuers” during Prohibition, or more recently, the Bundy gang of “sovereign
citizens.” How about belief in government “death panels,” or the famous Ronald
Reagan quote, “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from
the government, and I’m here to help?”
It’s also easy to see
why Stirner would have engaged in a bitter feud with the collectivist Karl
Marx, which he did. Stirner is the intellectual father of what is now known as
“individualist anarchism.” Offshoots
of egoism included the (mainly French) groups known as “illegalists” … essentially,
criminal gangs justifying their acts with anarchist logic. Does anybody remember
Patty Hearst, and the Symbionese Liberation Army?
In the 1870s and 1880s, as anarchism grew, the philosophy became
darker, giving rise to a group of insurrectionists who believed in something
another German, Johann Most, called “propaganda of the deed.” A short
description of this doctrine would be: terrorism!
The concept was, basically, to get people’s attention to the struggle by
killing them. Acts of terror (including bombings and assassinations) were
considered “propaganda” … they spread the word of the revolution through the
horror of “the deed.” One can only imagine the degree of alienation necessary
to formulate such a monstrous political theory. Johann Most apparently felt just
such alienation. He also conveniently had an explosives business, so he could
give a detailed description, in his work, of how to make a bomb to carry out this
“propaganda of the deed.” He was, literally, the original “bomb thrower.”
Idealistic Russians
Anarchism was attracting Russian intellectuals as well. Mikhail Bakunin, who had
been a follower of Marx, but quickly lost ties with others in the International
Workingmen’s Association (First International), when forced to flee his
home country. Living in exile because of writings condemning Russian hegemony
over post-partition Poland, Bakunin dropped out of sight. What Bakunin did,
instead, was travel the world, spreading his own collectivist and
anti-imperialist ideas far and wide – to Spain, Italy, Latin America, even the
U.S. – a veritable “Johnny Appleseed” of anarchism. By the end of his life
(1876), there were anarchist cells everywhere. Many of Marx’s early followers
from the First International were deserting their German mentor for what might
be called the “Anarchist International” (except that the term was officially
adopted in 1968 by another group, “International of Anarchist Federations”). Its first congress was held in Switzerland in
1872.
Peter
Kropotkin, another Russian, who flourished just prior to the Bolshevik
Revolution (November,1917), was a member of the aristocracy, and had an
exemplary early career as a geographer in Siberia. He became radicalized, like
Bakunin, and affiliated himself with the First International in the early
1870s, just as it was starting to collapse from the growing anarchist influences. He, too, declared himself an anarchist, and
followed some of the more radical elements of the philosophy taking shape in
the 1880s, including “propaganda of the deed.”
Kropotkin finally returned to Russia, after 40 years of
exile for his subversive activities, just in time for the February Revolution
of 1917. He was now considered a hero to the left-wing elements among his
countrymen – but, when the Bolshevik Revolution followed only eight months
later, Kropotkin was not hesitant to decry the new statist regime of Lenin and
Trotsky. He accused it of “burying the revolution,” writing that the ultimate
end of the experiment would be the return of capitalism. This is exactly what
he had spent the last 40 years fighting. He died of pneumonia in 1921, a
disheartened, and still angry, old man.
For the most part, however, the Bolsheviks either
intimidated, or co-opted, the Russian anarchists into following their version
of “The Revolution,” and the Communist International carried that strategy
around the world. Anarchism soon began to fade in the collective memories of
most in the West, especially because of the violent actions of some of its more
extreme believers.
Emma Goldman, American Anarchist
Anarchism entered the United States, first via individualist
anarchists like Benjamin Tucker, who published a newspaper called “Liberty”
(1881), advocating something like libertarianism, but claiming its editor’s
adherence to the philosophy of Proudhon. Although Bakunin had visited the U.S.,
Canada, and Mexico, in the 1870s, Tucker’s newspaper was the first home grown
American exponent of the creed. And, in 1885, a certain teenage Russian
immigrant named Emma
Goldman, a victim of rape in her father’s corset shop, who had earlier become
enthralled with the radical philosophy of nihilism, rejecting all religious and
moral values, or any meaning to life. She had found the 1881 assassination of
Tsar Alexander II fascinating.
She wished to escape her family, especially her disapproving
father who called her a “loose woman,” at age 15. He had arranged a marriage for
Emma, to somebody she despised. She refused. Emma arrived in Rochester, New
York to live with her sister. It was there that she became interested in
anarchist literature, reading with interest of the 1886 Haymarket Affair in
Chicago. Unfortunately, Rochester was no escape from her parents, who followed
her there, after a year.
She fled from them, again, to New York City, and immediately
met Johann Most. Despite an early affinity for his “propaganda of the deed,”
she argued with him, spurning his mentorship. But, her New York lover,
Alexander Berkman, was a true believer in Most’s doctrine -- including
“attentat,” an act of violence intended to stir the masses to revolt. Berkman
attempted to carry out an elaborate plan to assassinate Henry Clay Frick, the
manager of the Homestead Steel Works, near Pittsburgh, in 1892. He failed, and was
sentenced to 22 years in prison for attempted murder. Goldman was implicated in
the plot, but never brought to trial. She did do time for “inciting to riot,”
following 1893 food riots. Thanks to an interview by Nellie Bly of the New York
World, she became an early feminist hero. Her growing public support didn’t
keep her from being sentenced, however. She had become a bona fide celebrity … making
her a “dangerous person,” according to the prosecutor.
In 1901, an anarchist follower of Most did succeed in an assassination plot. President William McKinley
was shot and killed by Leon Czolgosz. During the assassin’s lengthy
interrogation after his arrest, he said he had been inspired by Emma Goldman … whom he had been stalking for some time,
although apparently never befriended. Goldman was arrested and detained, based
on his story, but released, since no further evidence could be found of her
involvement. Czolgosz was executed, and McKinley’s successor, Theodore
Roosevelt, vowed to crack down, not only on all anarchists, but their
sympathizers as well.
Goldman temporarily withdrew from public life, vilified not
only by the authorities, but by other anarchists, as well, for refusing to
condemn Czolgosz’ action. She later re-emerged as a vocal supporter of Margaret
Sanger and the early women’s health movement (aka, birth control), and she enthusiastically
served more jail time for violating the Comstock Act that made it illegal to distribute
information about contraception. Yet, she opposed the suffragists, since she
had always felt that voting was an act of complicity with the state, hence with
capitalism.
Then, in 1917, when conscription was introduced, she and
Berkman were imprisoned again, under the new Espionage Act, for “inducing
persons not to register.” After completion of their two-year sentences, they
were both deported to Russia – where Goldman had an opportunity to become
disenchanted with the Bolshevik Revolution. As a life-long free speech
advocate, she couldn’t countenance what had emerged as the dystopian workers’
state of the Soviet Union.
Near the end of her life (1940), living in London, she
opposed going to war, hating equally the European fascists and Stalin, and writing
that the Western democracies were really “fascists in disguise.” She had always
abhorred capitalism as incompatible with human liberty, throughout her life.
It’s Alive!
Today, in the United States, we have obvious progeny of the
anarchist movements of the 19th and early 20th centuries.
American libertarians, inspired by Ayn Rand, have adopted the wholesale
rejection of many trappings of the state – taxation, regulation, and other
forms of government control. They are also suspicious of foreign entanglements.
Like Max Stirner, they seem to be driven by egoism, or selfishness. They tend
to believe only in the power of the marketplace to determine social priorities.
On the left, we have seen actual riots motivated by
anarchist principles, including the anti-globalists protesting the WTO meeting
in Seattle, 1999 – much like the 1893 food riots that sent Emma Goldman to
prison. With the Internet enabling much
faster communication among followers, the Seattle protests were managed by
anonymous, leaderless “black blocs,” cells that couldn’t be traced.
In 2011, anarchist organizing prowess re-appeared for the
Zuccotti Park Occupy Wall Street squatting action. It was also decentralized,
spawning simultaneous occupations in many cities, across the globe. OccupyWallStreet.net
is still an active web site, available everywhere, with no shortage of
anarchist polemic, and requisite calls to action.
A left-libertarian
environmentalist movement has also emerged, harkening back to Proudhon’s
original mutualism – they believe the commons should not be anybody’s property,
but should be collectively owned for the mutual benefit of stakeholders.
Most left-of-center political parties, worldwide,
acknowledge the core principles of the first anarchists: liberation of workers
from the yoke of capitalism, either through conventional politics or
extraordinary means; freedom from rules imposed by state machinery caring only
for maintaining power; equitable distribution of resources (“from each
according to ability, to each according to need”).
Anything new? In this country, and Europe as well, there are
ethnic/racial tensions which are not directly addressed by anarchism, both from
the left (Black Lives Matter) and the right (white nationalism).
Deletions? Hopefully, established political parties in
democracies have all disowned illegalism, and Most’s “propaganda of the deed” –
those were the crazy anarchists. But, what of non-democratic states, the
dictatorships and kleptocracies we are fortunate not to live in? Can’t we
imagine radical … even violent … solutions in some of them? The Arab Spring?
Overall, it seems little has changed over the last 200 years
when it comes to political theory on the left side of the spectrum. And, with
libertarians on the right, the semi-circle of the 1789 Assemblee Constituante sometimes
looks like a nearly complete circle … with diminishing distance between extreme
left and extreme right!
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