What Really Did Happen in January?
William Sundwick
On January 3, we received news that a U.S. drone had killed Iranian
Gen. Qasem Soleimani
while he visited militias in Iraq. He was allegedly the second most powerful
man in Iran, a national hero branded by the U.S. as a terrorist. For about one
week, the news cycle was dominated by fear of all-out war between the U.S. and
Iran.
Iran responded by launching 16 missiles into a U.S. occupied
Iraqi air base near Baghdad, with injuries but no fatalities. Diplomatic notes
relayed by Swiss intermediaries indicated that this would
be the full extent of Iran’s retaliation, for now. Then, as if by Karma, an
Iranian
missile mistakenly downed a Ukrainian airliner near Tehran’s airport,
killing all 176 aboard (many Canadians but no Americans). Street protests in
Tehran again turned against the government – as they had been before the drone
assassination – giving little respite for the Ayatollah.
News media promptly abandoned talk of potential Iranian
cyberwarfare attacks and other doomsday scenarios that had been so prevalent in
the preceding week. It was back to the Senate impeachment trial and a feud brewing
between two Democratic presidential front-runners.
What happened? Was there really such confidence that nothing
would come of such a brazen violation of international law as assassination?
The Iraqi parliament overwhelmingly passed a non-binding resolution that all
U.S. forces leave the country immediately. Are we so jaded that we just shrug
off these incidents as a natural consequence of the still-legal Global War on
Terror (GWOT)? In domestic U.S. law, if the killing
is in war, it’s not illegal!
It’s useful to look at a consistently erratic U.S. policy
toward Iran, and the Middle East in general, stretching back decades – arguably
to the 1950s. In 1953, a joint MI6/CIA coup d’etat successfully overthrew the
popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh.
His crime: seeking to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The young
monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza-Pahlavi became a U.S. puppet, with newly
established dictatorial powers (previously Iran had been a constitutional
monarchy with most powers devolving to the Majlis and government). At about the
same time, the height of the Cold War, U.S. and British oil interests began
consolidating their influence over the absolutist monarchy across the Gulf –
Saudi Arabia. At that time, control
of the huge oil reserves around the Persian Gulf waxed very large in
strategic western planning. It was imperative that the Soviet Union not gain control
over the region, restricting access to those resources – any political
instability in the littoral nations was actively discouraged.
That was then. Today, it is more difficult to understand the
importance of that geostrategic principle. Both the U.S. and Russia are
self-sufficient in fossil fuel resources, and the world in general needs to
collaborate in reducing its dependence on all carbon-intensive fuels. Oil just
isn’t a big thing anymore. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran realize this. Yet, their
economies depend on oil revenue. And, that’s not the extent of the competition
between the two regional
would-be hegemons.
When Iran finally succeeded in overthrowing the American
puppet Shah in 1979, their revolution was driven by two fundamental precepts,
to extricate the Americans and to establish Iran, seat of the Shia sect of
Islam, as the spiritual center of the Muslim world. The first of these put them
on a collision course with U.S. foreign policy, the second with the Saudi
monarchy which claimed full control of the holy cities of Medina and Mecca.
Saudis hosted the Haj each year, just as the Ottoman Empire had done until its
retreat from Arabia in World War I. It also claimed religious hegemony over
Muslims worldwide. Now Iran was challenging that hegemony.
But it was the U.S. that ordered the assassination of an
Iranian general in Iraq. Not Saudi Prince Mohammed bin-Salman. The U.S. had even
encouraged and aided Saddam Hussein in invading Iran in 1980, leading to an
eight-year-long struggle with thousands of casualties, and ultimate Iraqi defeat.
Why?
This is where the intricate patchwork of weak nation-states,
ethnic enmities, and fragmented alliances among the various nations in the
region enter the picture. It’s an old story, going back to the dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire. Iraq and Syria, in particular (perhaps Lebanon and
Palestine/Israel as well) have never been successful independent states – their
peak prosperity and stability was in those late Ottoman days, and as European protectorates
later. Ethnic and sectarian tensions have riddled those countries ever since.
The oil era was characterized by a monopoly situation, where the region was the
only supplier to many world markets. The petty players of the Arabian Peninsula
(UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Yemen) also enter the picture. They are the periphery
of Saudi power, always vulnerable to exploitation by the Kingdom’s rivals, like
Iran. Indeed, since 1979, Iran has become far more aggressive in its efforts to
do just that. The Quds Force
of proxy militias in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, created and directed by
Qasem Soleimani, became Iran’s vanguard for establishing regional hegemony over
both U.S. interests and Saudi Arabia’s.
But none of this explains why the U.S. felt it needed to
assassinate him. Everybody knew he would simply be replaced by another
commander. There was no explanation given of any “imminent” threat. Was it simply
a distraction from the President’s impeachment trial? By the final week of
January, the episode remained a mystery. Iran, to its credit, responded in a
measured, rational manner (perhaps merely due to embarrassment
over the mistaken downing of the airliner).
The news media have grown weary of trying to solve the
mystery. Perhaps it’s just “too complicated” to garner enough eyeballs or
clicks. Adam Schiff’s eloquent summaries of the impeachment case and Bernie
Sanders’ spurned handshake after the last Democratic debate make for much more
entertaining speculation – they’re not so complicated!
some readers have commented on this assertion: "Oil just isn’t a big thing anymore." They note that, while U.S. and Russia may be self-sufficient, Europe, China, Japan are still very dependent on oil imports from Middle East. Author notes this fact, but still wants to view it in the context of history, and U.S. foreign policy.
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